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FORENSIC BORDER SEARCHES AFTER CARPENTER REQUIRE
PROBABLE CAUSE AND A WARRANT
Christopher I . Pryby*
Under the border search doctrine, courts have upheld the federal govern-
ment’s practice of searching people and their possessions upon entry into or
exit from the United States, without any requirement of suspicion, as reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment . Since the advent of electronic devices
with large storage capacities, courts have grappled with whether this defini-
tion of reasonableness continues to apply . So far, courts have consistently
characterized “nonforensic” border inspections of electronic devices (for ex-
ample, paging through photos on a phone) as “routine” searches that, like in-
specting luggage brought across international lines, require no suspicion . But
there is a circuit split over what suspicion the government needs to conduct
“forensic” searches that copy data for later inspection . This Note argues that
the recent Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. United States recognized
a new balance of privacy rights at the border . Starting in United States v.
Jones and continuing through Riley v. California and Carpenter, the Court
has developed a theory of data privacy aimed at forestalling the government’s
creation of a high-tech panopticon . This new theory, in the context of elec-
tronic searches at the border, requires that the balance of government and
individual interests be struck in favor of the individual . Probable cause and a
warrant, not merely reasonable suspicion, are necessary for a forensic search .
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Pascal, a dual citizen of the United States and France, is a doctoral stu-
dent in Islamic studies at a Canadian university. He is riding an Amtrak
train from Montreal to New York when Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) agents board the train at the U.S.-Canada border. During questioning,
Pascal admits that he has lived in Jordan and visited Lebanon in the past
year. The agents order him to bring his luggage to the dining car for inspec-
tion and to unlock his laptop. While inspecting files on his computer, they
see images of Hezbollah and Hamas rallies. Unsatisfied with Pascal’s expla-
nation that he observed the rallies as research for his dissertation, the agents
confiscate his laptop and other electronics for further search. The agents re-
lease him later that day and return his cell phones and camera, but they send
his laptop and external hard drive to Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE). Pascal receives those items by mail eleven days later. He is never
charged with a crime, but it is clear that, at a minimum, agents have viewed
files including personal photographs, messages with his girlfriend, and
emails. It is possible they logged into his social networking accounts too. He
further suspects that ICE has retained copies of the data from his devices.
This is not a contrived hypothetical. The facts above come from a real
case: Abidor v . Napolitano.1 Travelers are accustomed to certain invasions of
physical privacy as part of the norms of the exercise—it is the price of keep-
ing would-be terrorists off planes. For international travelers, a customs in-
spection is also possible—and about as welcome as a jury summons. But
many Americans do not realize the extent to which the government asserts
1. 990 F. Supp. 2d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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authority to inspect anything entering or leaving the country.2 The border
search doctrine has traditionally required no suspicion at all for government
agents to search anything at the border,3 and courts have only recently begun
to consider whether this ability to search “anything” should include the con-
tents of travelers’ phones, cameras, and laptops.
This issue deserves close scrutiny. First, troublingly expansive interpre-
tations of the border search doctrine are not confined to a single political
party or ideology. In fact, although generally considered friendlier to civil
rights than the Trump Administration,4 the Obama Administration claimed
the power to conduct the search at issue in Abidor. Second, there is a circuit
split on the issue. Although federal courts of appeals have unanimously held
that no suspicion is needed if agents merely look at files on electronic devices
at the border, they are divided on whether agents need some amount of sus-
picion to copy the contents of those devices for later review (a “forensic
search”). Third, a recent line of Supreme Court cases on Fourth Amendment
rights, most recently Carpenter v . United States,5 has endorsed reasoning
that compels a reexamination of the border search doctrine’s applicability to
electronic data.
This Note argues that reasonable suspicion is not enough. Specifically,
courts should require the government to develop probable cause that a de-
vice contains evidence of a crime before it conducts a forensic border search
on that device. Part I reviews the border search doctrine’s history and its tra-
ditional bifurcation between “routine” and “nonroutine” searches. Part II ex-
amines how the doctrine has come into conflict with separate precedent
governing electronic data privacy. In particular, it explores the circuit split—
between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits on the one hand and the Eleventh
Circuit on the other—and these courts’ attempts to reconcile the historical
border search exception with recent Supreme Court decisions. Finally, Part
III contends that the balance of government and individual interests, viewed
through the lens of Supreme Court data privacy precedent, requires probable
cause and a warrant for a forensic border search.
2 . E .g ., Patrick G. Lee, Can Customs and Border Officials Search Your Phone? These Are
Your Rights, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 13, 2017, 12:55 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/can-
customs-border-protection-search-phone-legal-rights [https://perma.cc/37J7-85TY] (“The
unsettling fact is that border officials have long had broad powers—many people just don’t
know about them.”).
3 . See infra Part I.
4 . See, e .g ., Trump Administration Civil and Human Rights Rollbacks, LEADERSHIP
CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., https://civilrights.org/trump-rollbacks [https://perma.cc/H22Y-
UZME] (collecting actions by the Trump Administration alleged to infringe on civil rights,
including rollbacks of some Obama Administration policies).
5. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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I. THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects[] against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”6 But unlike searches in the interior of the country,
border searches have never required probable cause.7 This Part describes the
origins and traditional operation of the border search doctrine. Section I.A
focuses on three primary justifications for suspicionless border searches: the
history of the practice, original understandings of what constitutes a reason-
able search, and the balance of government and individual interests. Section
I.B discusses the distinction between routine and nonroutine border search-
es and the level of suspicion courts have required for each.
A. Doctrinal Origins
The border search exception to the general warrant and probable cause
requirements “has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.”8 The
Constitution grants Congress “broad, comprehensive powers ‘[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations,’ ”9 including the ability to exclude aliens
and property and to interdict smuggling.10 In fact, from the Founding, cus-
toms officials routinely inspected imports to assess duties and seize contra-
band.11 And the Supreme Court has recognized a “longstanding right of the
sovereign to protect itself” by inspecting persons and items entering the
country.12 Moreover, the Court has stressed that the border search exception
does not result from “exigent circumstances,” like some exceptions to the
warrant requirement, but is instead founded on a “historically recognized
exception” to the warrant requirement, much like the rule permitting a
search incident to a lawful arrest.13
The Court has also marshalled an original-understanding argument to
justify the border search exception. The first Congress, the same that drafted
the Bill of Rights, enacted a law authorizing customs officials “on suspicion
of fraud, to open and examine . . . any package or packages” and to board
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
8 . Id .
9. United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973)
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
10 . Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
11 . See id . at 616, 619; United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376
(1971) (describing customs inspections as “an old practice . . . intimately associated with ex-
cluding illegal articles from the country”).
12 . Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616; see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531, 537 (1985) (“Since the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive ple-
nary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause
or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of
contraband into this country.”).
13 . Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 621. For searches incident to lawful arrest, see infra note 62.
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and search “any ship or vessel[] in which they shall have reason to suspect
any goods . . . subject to duty shall be concealed” and seize any contraband
found.14 Because that same Congress drafted the Fourth Amendment, the
Court has inferred that “reasonable searches and seizures” must encompass
the border searches authorized in that statute. Therefore, says the Court,
modern-day border searches are likewise reasonable.15
Besides looking to historical understandings of reasonableness, the
Court also determines whether a category of searches is reasonable by “bal-
ancing the [government’s] need to search against the [personal] invasion
which the search entails.”16 This kind of interest balancing justifies the bor-
der search exception. The Court has consistently recognized that “[t]he Gov-
ernment’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is
at its zenith at the international border”17—this interest is so powerful that
border searches “are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at
the border.”18 Additionally, the Court has held that individuals generally en-
joy a diminished expectation of privacy in such circumstances.19
B. Classifications of Border Searches
The border search exception to the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements is firmly entrenched in Fourth Amendment doctrine.20 Yet there
14. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23–24, 1 Stat. 29, 43, repealed and replaced by Act of
Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 47–48, 1 Stat. 145, 169–70 (containing the same language).
15 . Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–17, 619; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
But Boyd and Ramsey misread the extent of the statutes. Far from permitting customs inspec-
tors to search cargo without “any level of suspicion,” Recent Case, United States v. Touset:
Eleventh Circuit Holds That Border Searches of Property Require No Suspicion, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1112, 1116 (2019), the latter act only permitted inspectors to board a ship and take ac-
count of and affix seals to “any box, trunk, chest, cask, or other package . . . separate from . . .
the cargo,” Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. at 164–65. This language does not prove
“that the First Congress did not understand the Fourth Amendment to require individualized
suspicion to search property at the border,” Recent Case, supra at 1116. Although the second
act did permit inspectors to search the entirety of a vessel for cargo, it did not authorize inspec-
tors to search the cargo itself. Thus, the act is better read as retaining a suspicion requirement
before permitting plenary searches of personal property.
16. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
17. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
18 . Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616; see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531, 538 (1985) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively differ-
ent at the international border than in the interior.”).
19 . See, e .g ., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 n.1 (“Travellers may be so stopped
in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings as effects
which may be lawfully brought in.” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154
(1925))).
20 . But see United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018) (J. Pryor, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n my view, a forensic search of a cell phone at the border requires a warrant
supported by probable cause.”).
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are still constitutional limits on searches at the border. This Section will ex-
amine two categories of traditional, nonelectronic border searches—routine
and nonroutine searches—and the requirements courts have imposed on
them.
In general, “[r]outine searches of the persons and effects of entrants” in-
to the country “are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or warrant.”21 Routine searches include the kinds of inspec-
tions an average international traveler is acquainted with: looking through
luggage, checking vehicles for drugs, and conducting pat-downs and frisks.22
Still more intrusive searches are considered routine and have no suspicion
requirement, including opening and inspecting international mail23 and even
removing and disassembling a car’s gas tank.24
But not all such searches are routine. The Supreme Court in United
States v . Ramsey first hinted that a border search might be “ ‘unreasonable’
because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”25 Yet
it was not until United States v . Montoya de Hernandez that the Court first
ruled on that issue.26 There, the Court held that the “reasonable suspicion”
standard—a lower standard than probable cause—under which “officials at
the border must have a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting [a]
particular person,’ ” applied to border crossers suspected of smuggling drugs
in their bodies.27 The Court found that the reasonable suspicion standard fit
well because that “type of smuggling gives no external signs and inspectors
will rarely possess probable cause to arrest or search” and the government’s
interest in stopping drug smuggling remains high.28 The Montoya de Her-
nandez Court further held that the scope of the intrusion—here, including
incommunicado detention without a court order for nearly a full day and an
alternative between either defecating into a wastebasket under the “watchful
eyes of two attending matrons” or submitting to an abdominal x-ray while
handcuffed29—was justified by the reasonable suspicion standard.30
Perhaps because of how intrusive the Montoya de Hernandez search was,
lower courts have taken the case to require reasonable suspicion only for in-
21 . Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
22 . See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2014).
23 . See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619–20. The informational content of the letters, however,
was protected by regulation. Id . at 623.
24. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004). However, the Court not-
ed that the search did not irreversibly destroy the gas tank and that the outcome might have
differed if it had. Id . at 155–56.
25. 431 U.S. at 618 n.13.
26. 473 U.S. at 540 (“We have not previously decided what level of suspicion would jus-
tify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than a routine border search.”).
27 . Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–42 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
28 . Id .
29 . Id . at 546–47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30 . Id . at 542–44 (majority opinion).
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vasive border searches like strip searches and body cavity searches.31 Indeed,
the Court appeared to affirm this understanding in United States v . Flores-
Montano, explaining that the reasons supporting a suspicion requirement in
“highly intrusive searches of the person—dignity and privacy interests of the
person being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles.”32 Some lower
courts have even held that only searches of the person, not of property, re-
quire any level of suspicion at all, reading Flores-Montano to reject any dis-
tinction between “routine” and “nonroutine” searches.33 Still other courts
have attempted to articulate factors distinguishing the two.34 And the Su-
preme Court has not yet foreclosed the possibility that certain property
searches could be “ ‘so destructive,’ ‘particularly offensive,’ or overly intru-
sive in the manner in which they are carried out” that at least some suspicion
is necessary.35 In sum, however, once a court classifies a border search as
routine or nonroutine, that classification determines the level of suspicion
the government needs.
II. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY AND CONFLICT WITH THE BORDER SEARCH
EXCEPTION
So far, this Note has limited its discussion to traditional searches of per-
sons and property. But the factors relevant to distinguishing between routine
and nonroutine searches have become increasingly complicated when ap-
plied to new technology. This Part examines how courts have applied the
border search exception to data contained in electronic devices. Section II.A
discusses the emerging distinction between nonforensic searches and foren-
sic searches. Section II.B then highlights Carpenter v . United States, in which
the Supreme Court recognized strong Fourth Amendment protections of in-
dividuals’ right to privacy in their data. Section II.C concludes by exploring
the circuit conflict that developed as the lower courts grappled with reconcil-
ing the Court’s digital privacy doctrine with the longstanding border search
doctrine.
31 . See, e .g ., United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512–13 (1st Cir. 1988).
32. 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
33 . E .g ., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (“We have been
similarly unwilling to distinguish between different kinds of property. For example, we have
upheld ‘a search without reasonable suspicion of a crew member’s living quarters on a foreign
cargo vessel that [wa]s entering this country,’ even though ‘[a] cabin is a crew member’s
home—and a home “receives the greatest Fourth Amendment protection.” ’ ” (alterations in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 727, 729
(11th Cir. 2010))).
34. For example, the Braks court considered factors associated with the suspect’s per-
sonal dignity and bodily integrity. Braks, 842 F.2d at 511–12; accord United States v. Vega-
Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984). By contrast, the court in United States v . Saboon-
chi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 564 (D. Md. 2014), considered factors related to the amount of infor-
mation the government can obtain about the suspect.
35. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, 154 n.2, 156).
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A. Applying the Doctrine to Electronic Devices
In applying the border search doctrine to electronic data, courts have at-
tempted to mirror the existing, if not entirely clear, distinction between rou-
tine and nonroutine searches. The principal split focuses on the treatment of
“nonforensic” and “forensic” searches. The general rule is that a nonforensic
search is a search of electronic media limited in duration and scope by the
fact that an officer must manually conduct it.36 For example, if a border
agent looks at videos on a camera in a van crossing the border37 or selects an
international airline passenger at random and looks at photos on the passen-
ger’s computer,38 the agent has conducted a nonforensic search. Even
searching files on an external hard drive at a customs checkpoint or inspect-
ing a computer’s directory tree with the computer’s own search functions is
nonforensic so long as it remains bound by a human agent’s limited time
and ability to perform the search in person.39
Courts have consistently held that nonforensic searches at the border
require no suspicion.40 Some courts have justified this permissiveness by
analogy to routine searches of personal property at the border—just as a
border agent needs no suspicion to look inside luggage, she does not need it
to look inside a cell phone or a laptop.41 Moreover, the time and resource
constraints on CBP mean that an agent would hardly be in a position to rifle
through every personal file of every traveler lumbering past her booth.42 The
intrusion on privacy therefore remains limited in practice despite being un-
limited in theory.
36 . See Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 269–70 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“A quick
look entails only a cursory search that an officer may perform manually. It involves opening
the computer and viewing the computer’s contents as any lay person might be capable of doing
simply by clicking through various folders.”).
37. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502 (4th Cir. 2005).
38. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008).
39 . See Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (“A conventional computer search allows Cus-
toms officers to choose, within the finite amount of time available to them while they detain
the traveler, to decide where . . . to focus their attention . . . . A forensic search, on the other
hand, allows a Customs officer to give uniquely probing review not only to the files on one’s
computer, but also any files that ever may have been on that computer. And even after a travel-
er is cleared to enter the country, the search may continue for months or even years after-
wards.”).
But new technologies could recognize potentially illegal data on a device more quickly.
See, e .g ., Mohamed N. Moustafa, Applying Deep Learning to Classify Pornographic Images
and Videos (Nov. 28, 2015), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.08899.pdf [https://perma.cc/358M-
8D9E]. It is doubtful that a time bound will remain a useful heuristic to categorize forensic and
nonforensic searches.
40 . See, e .g ., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 140 (4th Cir. 2018) (reporting the
district court’s holding on this issue); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008; Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502.
41 . See, e .g ., Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 (“Arnold has failed to distinguish how the search
of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically any different from the suspicionless border
searches of travelers’ luggage that the Supreme Court and we have allowed.”).
42 . Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
December 2019] Forensic Border Searches After Carpenter 515
Forensic searches, by contrast, eliminate the inherent time and resource
bounds on electronic searches conducted by hand. A forensic search is “an
exhaustive search of a computer’s entire hard drive”43 in which the govern-
ment copies the data stored on a device for later inspection.44 A forensic
search can also access data the user has supposedly deleted—for example,
data “emptied from the operating system’s trash or recycling bin folder” that
the user cannot see or access without using special software.45
The Ninth Circuit in United States v . Cotterman was the first federal ap-
pellate court to decide whether a forensic search of an electronic device at
the border requires some amount of suspicion.46 After an en banc hearing,
the court held that reasonable suspicion was required.47 In Cotterman, the
government seized the defendant’s laptop at the U.S.-Mexico border, copied
the contents of its hard drive, and examined that data over the course of
months.48 The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that Flo-
res-Montano controlled, distinguishing “[t]he private information individu-
als store on digital devices” at issue in Cotterman from a gas tank’s “generic
and impersonal contents.”49
Cotterman came shortly after United States v . Jones, in which four justic-
es held that sufficiently long-term warrantless GPS tracking of a suspect’s
vehicle was a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.50 Additionally,
in a concurrence, Justice Sotomayor strongly suggested that surveillance cre-
ating “precise, comprehensive record[s] . . . reflect[ing] a wealth of detail”
about a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associ-
ations” that can be “store[d] . . . and efficiently mine[d] . . . years into the fu-
ture” is similarly unreasonable without a warrant.51 In line with Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, the Ninth Circuit in Cotterman paid “par-
ticular heed to the nature of the electronic devices and the attendant expecta-
tion of privacy” and compared the procedure to “a computer strip search.”52
The Cotterman court emphasized the volume of information electronic de-
43. Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
44 . See, e .g ., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (de-
scribing the process by which a computer forensic examiner “cop[ied] the hard drives of [de-
fendant’s] electronic devices” and “used forensic software that often must run for several hours
to examine” those copies).
45. United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2011).
46. 709 F.3d at 956–57.
47 . Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957.
48 . Id . at 957–59. The examination included inspecting supposedly deleted files as well
as unlocking password-protected files. Id .
49 . Id . at 964.
50. 565 U.S. 400, 431 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
51 . Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
52 . Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964, 966.
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vices can store53 and the “Founders’ deep concern with safeguarding the pri-
vacy of thoughts and ideas . . . from invasion by the government.”54 Because
these devices “often retain sensitive and confidential information” long after
their users believe that information to be deleted, the court further expressed
concern that travelers could not “make meaningful decisions” about what
content to expose to potential search at the border.55 Given these factors, the
forensic search of the defendant’s data was “[s]uch a thorough and detailed
search of the most intimate details of [his] life” that it substantially intruded
on his dignity and privacy interests and was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.56
The Ninth Circuit balanced the government’s “important security con-
cerns” at the border with the “potential unfettered dragnet effect” that might
result should the government ever have “the time or resources to seize and
search the millions of devices that accompany the millions of travelers”
crossing the country’s borders.57 In its view, requiring reasonable suspicion
would “leave[] ample room for agents . . . to pick up on subtle cues that
criminal activity may be afoot,”58 and, “[a]s a practical matter, border agents
are too busy to do extensive searches . . . unless they have suspicion.”59 The
court then adopted reasonable suspicion as the prerequisite for the govern-
ment to perform a forensic search of an electronic device at the border.60
B. Digital Privacy Trumps a Longstanding Warrant Exception
The Supreme Court largely confirmed the Ninth Circuit’s understand-
ing of electronic privacy about a year later. In Riley v . California, the Court
found that a warrant was required to search the contents of a cell phone on
the arrestee’s person61 despite the longstanding exception permitting a
search of an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest.62 The Court explained that
the traditional rationale for the exception—preventing “harm to officers and
destruction of evidence”—is inapplicable to electronic data.63 Cell phone da-
53 . Id . at 964 (contrasting the “warehouses full of information” modern devices can
store with the amount “traditionally circumscribed by the size of [a] traveler’s luggage or au-
tomobile”).
54 . Id . (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d
993, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
55 . Id . at 965.
56 . Id . at 968.
57 . Id . at 966.
58 . Id . at 967 (citing United States v. Tiong, 224 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000)).
59 . Id . at 967 n.14 (quoting United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir.
2005) (B. Fletcher, J., concurring)).
60 . Id . at 968.
61. 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
62 . E .g ., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (establishing the exception).
63 . Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–86 (“Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we
generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement
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ta itself is not a weapon, nor is there “any risk that the arrestee himself will
be able to delete incriminating data from the phone” once police have se-
cured it while they wait for a warrant.64
Riley also highlighted that an arrestee’s privacy interests, albeit “dimin-
ished,” may still be “weighty enough” to require a warrant.65 Recalling the
“top-to-bottom search of a man’s house” of Chimel v . California, the Court
noted that searching a phone “would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house.”66 Just as the Ninth Circuit
did in Cotterman, the Court pointed to cell phones’ “immense storage capac-
ity” and the intimacy of their contents as causes for concern about indis-
criminate phone searches.67 Rejecting that “[m]odern cell phones are . . . just
another technological convenience,” Riley held that these devices contain the
essential “privacies of life” that the Founders fought for.68
But behind Riley’s melody lay a familiar rhythm—a call to defer to legis-
lative action. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion conceding that, alt-
hough the balance the Court had struck between law enforcement and
privacy would create legal anomalies, he could “not see a workable alterna-
tive” given the need for “clear rules regarding searches incident to arrest.”69
Nevertheless, he warned against using “the blunt instrument of the Fourth
Amendment” to protect electronic privacy, particularly since courts are
“poorly positioned to understand and evaluate” the “very sensitive privacy
‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate government
interests.’ ” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).
The “trilogy” of cases the Court analyzed included Chimel v . California, 395 U.S. 752,
762–63 (1969) (holding a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest to be reasonable if per-
formed “to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape” or “to prevent . . . concealment or destruction” of evidence, whether “on the
arrestee’s person” or “the area ‘within his immediate control’ ”), United States v . Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973) (permitting a search incident to lawful arrest as reasonable despite a
low probability in a particular case “that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
person of the suspect”), and Arizona v . Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 343 (2009) (recognizing the
officer safety and evidence preservation concerns and authorizing a warrantless search of a ve-
hicle incident to an arrest “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of
the passenger compartment at the time of the search”). Riley, 573 U.S. at 382–85.
64 . Riley, 573 U.S. at 387–88. The Court also addressed arguments concerning remote
data wiping and encryption, finding them inadequate to permit police to search a phone’s con-
tents upon arrest absent exigent circumstances. Id . at 388–89.
65 . Id . at 392 (quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013)).
66 . Id . at 392, 396.
67 . Id . at 393. Riley went further than Cotterman in some respects, enumerating addi-
tional factors raising privacy concerns, including that “a cell phone collects in one place many
distinct types of information . . . that reveal much more in combination than any isolated rec-
ord” and that “the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.”
Id . at 394.
68 . Id . at 403.
69 . Id . at 407 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
518 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:507
interests” modern technology implicates.70 For Justice Alito, Congress had
demonstrated itself able to respond to those concerns71 and react to techno-
logical changes and their privacy implications.72 Justice Alito’s call would be
taken up in the lower courts as they began to decide border search cases in
the wake of Riley.
C. The Circuits Split over Riley
Relying on Riley, the Fourth Circuit threw in with the Ninth Circuit and
held that a forensic search at the border requires at least reasonable, individ-
ualized suspicion.73 In United States v . Kolsuz, customs agents detained the
defendant, bound for Turkey from the United States, after finding gun parts
in his luggage.74 The agents seized his smartphone and sent it off-site for fo-
rensic analysis, which uncovered a massive amount of personal data.75 The
Fourth Circuit first addressed the threshold issue of whether the search was
incident to the defendant’s arrest (and therefore squarely within Riley’s war-
rant requirement) or a border search.76 The court then reviewed case law
prior to Riley, including Flores-Montano’s admonition that “even at the bor-
der, individualized suspicion is necessary to justify certain ‘highly intrusive
searches.’ ”77 The court also considered the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the
scale and sensitivity of information subject to exposure during a forensic
search,78 not to mention the ubiquity of electronic devices,79 required rea-
sonable suspicion. And if the panel believed that a plausible argument for a
suspicion requirement existed even before Riley came down, the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in that case only confirmed it.80 Although the Fourth Cir-
cuit ultimately punted on the question of whether the government needed
70 . Id . at 408.
71. Id . To use his example, it did so by passing Title III, sec. 802, of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90–351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510–20 (2012 & Supp. 2018)), after the Court announced the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test in Katz v . United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72 . Riley, 573 U.S. at 408 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
73. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018).
74 . Id . at 136.
75 . Id . at 139 (“[T]he data extraction process lasted for a full month[] and yielded an
896-page report that included Kolsuz’s personal contact lists, emails, messenger conversations,
photographs, videos, calendar, web browsing history, and call logs, along with a history of
Kolsuz’s physical location down to precise GPS coordinates.”).
76 . Id . at 136–37. The court held it was a border search. Id . at 144.
77 . Id . at 144 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
78 . Id . at 144–45. Because Kolsuz’s phone contained his GPS location data, the court
also drew on Justice Sotomayor’s mosaic concern from Jones. Id . at 145.
79 . Id . at 145 (“[I]t is neither ‘realistic nor reasonable to expect the average traveler to
leave his digital devices at home when traveling.’ ” (quoting United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F.
Supp. 2d 536, 556 (D. Md. 2014))).
80 . Id . at 144–45.
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merely reasonable suspicion or as much as probable cause,81 forensic search-
es at the border became subject to at least the reasonable suspicion standard
in another circuit.
Still, doubts about the judiciary’s role in regulating digital privacy—like
those informing Justice Alito’s concurrence in Riley—motivated one mem-
ber of the Kolsuz panel. Concurring only in the judgment, Judge Wilkinson
expressed grave concern that the court had unilaterally struck a constitu-
tional balance on border searches, “where there is a longstanding historical
practice . . . of deferring to the legislative and executive branches.”82 Judge
Wilkinson argued that, especially given the perils of terrorism, courts put
American lives in jeopardy by giving insufficient weight to security inter-
ests.83 It would be more appropriate, Judge Wilkinson argued, to allow Con-
gress and the Executive to make such determinations, because they are
entrusted with the same responsibility to uphold the Constitution and are
better positioned than the judiciary to evaluate the perils of technology at the
border.84
The Eleventh Circuit decided United States v . Touset85 just five days after
Kolsuz. The Touset court held that the government needs no suspicion to
conduct a forensic search of an electronic device at the border.86 Putting the
circuit at odds with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the opinion nonetheless
resonated with Justice Alito’s and Judge Wilkinson’s arguments that the po-
litical branches, not the courts, should set the balance between digital privacy
and border security.87
But the Touset opinion did not just focus on the proper role of the
courts in national security; it broke sharply with the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
cuits’ readings of Supreme Court precedent. Relying on the longstanding
sovereign power to exclude, the panel interpreted prior case law to mean that
all property searches at the border were reasonable without any suspicion.88
Mr. Touset’s attempt to invoke Riley failed to persuade the court. Although
he had been lawfully arrested, the government’s forensic search of his devic-
es was incident to his border crossing, not his arrest (indeed, he was arrested
only after the forensic search revealed child pornography).89 The court saw
Riley as “expressly limited . . . to the search-incident-to-arrest exception”
81 . Id . at 147.
82 . Id . at 153 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the judgment).
83 . Id . at 152.
84 . Id . at 152–53.
85. 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
86 . Touset, 890 F.3d at 1229.
87 . Id . at 1236–37.
88 . Id . at 1233 (“We see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require suspicion
for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement for a search
of other personal property.”).
89 . Id . at 1230.
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without applicability to border searches.90 The court further viewed Riley as
inapposite because it saw the need for border searches “unencumbered by
judicial second-guessing” to be heightened, not lessened, by the presence of
electronic devices at the border.91 Digital contraband such as child pornog-
raphy “poses the same exact ‘risk’ of unlawful entry at the border as its phys-
ical counterpart,” if not a greater risk because of how easily and cheaply it
can be smuggled into the country.92 And if the government’s interest in
searching electronic devices is greater, surely the level of suspicion needed
for those searches cannot be greater.
* * *
Riley strongly suggested that the individual privacy interests in cell
phone data are much stronger than those same interests in physical objects
on one’s person. Yet the circuit courts have disagreed about how those
heightened interests interact with the already recognized strong government
interests at the border—the Fourth Circuit finding a need for at least reason-
able suspicion before permitting a forensic search and the Eleventh Circuit
finding no need for suspicion. And in Riley, Kolsuz, and Touset, there re-
mained the refrain that Congress and the Executive are better suited than the
courts to strike the balance between privacy and government interests. As
discussed in Part III, however, just a month after Kolsuz and Touset, Carpen-
ter v . United States93 resolved the split.
III. THE CASE FOR PROBABLE CAUSE AND A WARRANT
Carpenter decided that government inspection of a person’s cell-site lo-
cation data is a Fourth Amendment search.94 Although the police action in
Carpenter differed in many ways from a border search—few would deny that
CBP’s inspection of computer files is a Fourth Amendment search—the
Court’s rationale recognizes strong privacy rights in data affecting the calcu-
lus courts must consider for border searches. This Part argues that, based on
the reasoning developed in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, the government must
develop probable cause and obtain a warrant before performing a forensic
search of an electronic device at the border.
Section III.A responds to Justice Alito’s argument in Riley, later echoed
in the Kolsuz dissent and Touset majority, that the courts should defer to
Congress and the Executive in balancing constitutional rights and the gov-
ernment’s interest in national security at the border. The Section contends
that the courts should set a baseline level of Fourth Amendment protection
90 . Id . at 1234 (quoting United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018)).
91 . Id . at 1235.
92 . Id .
93. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
94 . Id .
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to check potential abusive behavior by the political branches. Section III.B
synthesizes Supreme Court case law to define the appropriate factors in
weighing the interests of the government and the individual in data searches.
Section III.C argues that the requirements of probable cause and a warrant
strike the right balance for forensic border searches in light of those factors.
Finally, Section III.D applies the rationale of the previous three Sections to
other kinds of border searches to sketch arguments for the proper standards
of suspicion in those cases.
A. The Courts Are Right to Decide This Question
Before arriving at the merits of the argument for probable cause, it is
necessary to explain why the judicial branch is the correct forum for this de-
cision. Justice Alito’s point is well taken that legislatures are often better situ-
ated to “assess and respond to” evolving technology and societal
circumstances.95 Whereas courts must wait for a case to arise involving a
new technology to consider the law’s application to that technology, legisla-
tures and executive agencies can proactively craft statutes and regulations to
address legal implications of a technology before cases even arise.96 Nor do
courts have the same resources to investigate changes in society or technolo-
gy. They lack the authority and finances to convene expert committees, often
rely on litigants to present their own experts,97 and face external time con-
straints. By contrast, legislatures and executive agencies frequently convene
expert panels and consult their own research staff to make recommendations
on proposed statutes and rules, and they can more readily access classified
information bearing on national security issues.98 The political branches
regularly seek public comment, while courts are instead isolated deci-
sionmakers, relying on parties and amicus briefs to make decisions. Indeed,
Congress and the Executive have proved themselves capable of making such
determinations. As Justice Alito pointed out in his Riley concurrence, Con-
gress enacted legislation establishing comprehensive procedures to govern
the authorization of wiretaps just a year after the Court issued its landmark
Katz v . United States opinion on the topic.99 And CBP has already issued
95. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
96 . See, e .g ., LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 96–97 (2d ed.
2013).
97 . See, e .g ., id . at 96; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (1985).
98 . See, e .g ., BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 96–97. But see Shirin Sinnar, Procedural
Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991 (2018) (challeng-
ing the idea that courts are ill-equipped to decide national security cases).
99 . See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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guidelines for border searches of electronic devices; the guidelines require
reasonable suspicion before conducting a forensic search.100
But even if courts have a more limited capacity to evaluate the impact of
technology on privacy, society, and national security, they remain invaluable
in striking the constitutional balance at the border. The political branches
are far from the “neutral and detached” magistrates who make findings of
probable cause to issue warrants.101 Instead, they operate under a popular
mandate to seek out and prevent threats to national security.102 The courts
dampen the passions of the majority by identifying fundamental societal val-
ues in the Constitution that must be preserved despite opposing political
pressure.103 Because they are insulated from electoral politics by lifetime ten-
ure, the courts can take a longer view than politicians and stop policies, even
popular ones, that would abridge constitutional protections.104
If courts declined to review the constitutionality of border searches,
there would be no external deterrent to arbitrary, discriminatory, and har-
assing searches. Nor could those whose rights are violated seek legal redress.
Most challenges against illegal searches are brought by criminal defendants
whose seized devices contained contraband; those whose devices come up
clean have little incentive to sue.105 And because those charged with crimes
after illegal searches often lack political power and popularity, Congress will
less likely choose to clamp down on executive overreach.106 The political
ratchet operates in just one direction—in favor of controlling crime and in-
creasing security107—and the insulated courts are the only real friction on
that ratchet. Therefore, the courts should review actions at the border for
reasonableness and impose a sanction if those actions do not meet that basic
100. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER SEARCH
OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 5 (2018) [hereinafter CBP DIRECTIVE] (“In instances in which there is
reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP, or in
which there is a national security concern . . . an Officer may perform an advanced search of an
electronic device.”).
101. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
102 . Cf . Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (referring to law enforcement’s
“often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464 (1932) (“Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search
warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the
excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.”).
103 . See, e .g ., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 60 (1991) (“[The Court’s] job is to
preserve the higher law solutions reached by the People against their erosion during periods of
normal politics.”); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 733–34 (1980) (ar-
guing that courts already decide cases based on “ethical arguments” and should be more trans-
parent about this fact).
104. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 97.
105 . See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Juris-
prudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1481 (1996).
106 . See, e .g ., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 529–30 (2001).
107 . See generally id .
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constitutional standard. Just as courts serve as an essential check on police
action inside the country’s borders, they must do the same at the border.
B. Jones, Riley, and Carpenter Recognize Strong Fourth Amendment
Privacy Interests in Data
This Note argues that probable cause and a warrant are needed for fo-
rensic searches at the border. As no court has ever imposed this standard for
border searches, it is important to show why the Supreme Court’s recent line
of decisions not only permits this doctrinal change but also requires it. This
Section analyzes the consistent line toward strong data privacy interests run-
ning through recent Court decisions, starting with Justice Sotomayor’s con-
currence in Jones, continuing through Riley, and culminating in Carpenter.
This analysis reveals that the Court’s primary concern is large-scale govern-
ment accumulation of personal data that could lead to a later loss of other
constitutional rights.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones espoused a mosaic theory of
the Fourth Amendment. The theory posits that, where the government can
collect enough individual observations on a person to form a picture of that
person’s private activities and beliefs—a picture invisible to one not privy to
the same wealth of information—it can use that information to chill, passive-
ly or actively, “associational and expressive freedoms.”108 Justice Sotomayor
suggested that this fear of totalitarian surveillance and suppression might
warrant judicial reconsideration of longstanding principles such as the pub-
lic-thoroughfares doctrine and the third-party doctrine.109 Importantly, she
also recognized the danger of the government’s indefinite retention of pri-
vate data.110
Riley embraced and extended Justice Sotomayor’s mosaic theory. Chief
Justice Roberts identified the storage capacity of a cell phone as a key factor
differentiating it from physical containers with respect to searches. That
storage capacity lets cell phones “collect[] in one place many distinct types of
information . . . that reveal much more in combination than any isolated
record.”111 In line with Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence, Chief Justice
Roberts found it troublesome that a cell phone search can reconstruct “[t]he
108. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
109 . See id . (“I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the government might obtain the
fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques.”); see also id . at
417 (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
For the public-thoroughfares doctrine, see generally California v . Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to re-
quire law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thor-
oughfares.”). For the third-party doctrine, see generally United States v . Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976), and Smith v . Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
110 . See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
111. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394 (2014).
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sum of an individual’s private life . . . through a thousand photographs la-
beled with dates, locations, and descriptions.”112 Ultimately, the Riley Court
carved out an exception to the longstanding doctrine permitting searches in-
cident to arrest: the mere fact that a device was on an arrestee’s person did
not excuse the arresting officer from developing sufficient probable cause
and “get[ting] a warrant” to search that device.113 Riley found a historical
doctrine based on obsolete considerations unsuited to the modern age.
If there were any remaining doubts about the Court’s direction on digi-
tal privacy rights, Carpenter resolved them. Again writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts echoed Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence, finding
that a central aim of the Framers in crafting the Fourth Amendment was “to
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”114 He re-
called Riley’s holding that the “immense storage capacity” of a cell phone re-
quired a warrant despite the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine: “neither of
its rationales has much force” in the new context.115 He also cited prior deci-
sions leaving open whether longstanding doctrine should be reevaluated in
light of new technologies.116
Carpenter declined to apply the categorical third-party rule to cell-site
location information. Chief Justice Roberts distinguished “detailed, encyclo-
pedic, and effortlessly compiled” cell-site location information from bank
statements “exposed to [bank] employees in the ordinary course of business”
and the “limited capabilities” of a pen register to record outgoing phone
numbers.117 He criticized the government’s position as “fail[ing] to contend
with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking
112 . Id .
113 . Id . at 403.
114. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). Compare with United States v . Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to
the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to
misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police
power and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’ ” (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 595 (1948))).
115 . Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 386, 393).
116 . E .g ., id . at 2215 (“[T]he Court reserved the question whether ‘different constitution-
al principles may be applicable’ if ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country
[were] possible.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 283–84 (1983))); id . (“ ‘[L]onger term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy’—regardless whether those movements were disclosed to
the public at large.” (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concur-
ring in the judgment))).
117 . Id . at 2216 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)). But, as Justice Kennedy noted, “The
troves of intimate information the Government can and does obtain using financial records
and telephone records dwarfs what can be gathered from cell-site records.” Id . at 2232 (Kenne-
dy, J., dissenting). Even so, the point remains that the Court’s ultimate concern was with the
amount and intimacy of data collected.
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of” someone’s location “not for a short period but for years and years.”118 He
painted a picture of an Orwellian panopticon, “ever alert” with “nearly infal-
lible” memory, capable of tracking “any activity on [a] phone,” a device he
once again described as “indispensable to participation in modern socie-
ty.”119 Because the records at issue created a “detailed chronicle of a person’s
physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years,”120
they were sufficiently different from the records in prior third-party doctrine
cases to justify a break from the hard rule of the past.
From Jones through Carpenter, the key question driving the Court in
electronic search cases has been whether some instance of surveillance (in-
cluding retention of its results) is quick enough, cheap enough, and scalable
enough to create the potential for a dystopian nightmare leading to the loss
of basic political and expressive freedoms. If so, then there must be sufficient
procedural barriers to ensure that, in light of the government’s interests, that
surveillance is reasonable.
C. Requiring Probable Cause and a Warrant Correctly Balances Interests in
Light of Jones, Riley, and Carpenter
Using the principles extracted from the decisions above, this Section an-
alyzes the balance between government border security interests and indi-
vidual privacy interests, concluding that probable cause is necessary for the
government to conduct a forensic search. This Section further considers the
potential for government agents to abuse the power to search electronic de-
vices without probable cause. It argues that judicial enforcement is needed to
deter arbitrary, discriminatory, and harassing forensic searches.
A short diversion at this point is warranted. Why is interest balancing
the correct method of analysis here—why not look to historical understand-
ings of reasonableness as done in Boyd, Ramsey, or Touset? In short, the pre-
sent has obsoleted notions of what was once reasonable. When Boyd was de-
decided in 1886, the property crossing the border was not much different
than a century before at the Founding, so historical understandings of rea-
sonableness mapped well onto then-current practices. But dramatic techno-
logical progress since 1886—and the Founding—now forecloses using
comparable circumstances in Fourth Amendment decisionmaking. Accord-
ingly, in cases like these, where historical understandings do not neatly track
modern realities, the Court regularly engages in interest balancing to resolve
constitutional questions.121
That said, it remains to conduct the interest analysis for reasonableness.
Requiring probable cause before conducting a forensic search imposes only a
minor burden on the government. A border agent need only identify factors
118 . Id . at 2219.
119 . Id . at 2220–21 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
120 . Id .
121 . See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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that, in the aggregate, lead to a “ ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that a
[forensic] search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.”122 The factors
present in the cases discussed above—a past conviction for possessing child
pornography or an open investigation on export violations, combined with
recent travel through countries known to be hotspots for sex trafficking or
terrorism—support reasonable suspicion for a nonforensic search.123 If that
search turned up suspicious files, probable cause for a deeper forensic search
would likely develop. And the burden on government agents to obtain a
warrant would be minimal: after developing probable cause, a border official
may seize the suspicious device pending a warrant.124
Further, requiring border agents to develop probable cause before foren-
sically searching a traveler’s device would likely not affect national security
interests appreciably. Because a forensic search takes so much time to com-
plete,125 it is unlikely to turn up evidence of drugs, weapons, or other tangi-
ble contraband items before a criminal has already cleared the border and
brought them into the country. And because no suspicion is needed to con-
duct physical searches of luggage at the border or to use drug- or bomb-
sniffing dogs at airports,126 a probable cause requirement for digital data will
not reduce border agents’ ability to seize physical contraband. As for elec-
tronic contraband, imposing a constitutional barrier of probable cause be-
fore seizing a device for forensic inspection would likely let in little more—if
any—illegal data. Indeed, any electronic data stopped at the border would
likely find another path into the country through the internet,127 so border
searches are not an effective shield against electronic contraband.128 In fact,
122. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 271 (1960)).
123. See infra Section III.D for a discussion of why nonforensic searches should require
reasonable suspicion.
124. Cf . Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462–63 (2011) (permitting police to enter a
home and seize evidence to prevent its destruction, provided the police did not violate the
Constitution leading up to the entry and seizure).
125. But see supra note 39. If technology developed for quickly detecting evidence of
physical contraband through a mobile phone or laptop search, the social burden of imposing a
probable cause requirement would increase. However, depending on the nature of the technol-
ogy and whether it stored information about files it searched, the intrusion on individual pri-
vacy might increase as well.
126. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
127. Ari B. Fontecchio, Note, Suspicionless Laptop Searches Under the Border Search Doc-
trine: The Fourth Amendment Exception that Swallows Your Laptop, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 231,
250–51 (2009) (“Data, on the other hand, may readily enter the U.S. within seconds from any-
where in the world without stopping at a physical border. Data is intangible; it can be copied
easily and moved quickly from one computer to another.”).
128. And to the extent we are concerned less with stopping the data than stopping crimi-
nals from entering the country, this sounds a lot more like a “general interest in law enforce-
ment” that ordinarily requires probable cause. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,
79 (2001).
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the probable cause requirement may actually reduce the overall burden on
the government. A thorough forensic search may take hours, days, or
months; requiring probable cause would redirect those resources to searches
more likely to be fruitful.129
By contrast, the individual interests at stake are enormous. Forensic
searches copy the entire contents of a person’s device, including private pho-
tos, videos, text messages, notes, call records, locational data, search queries,
and browser histories.130 All this data would almost certainly reveal a “wealth
of detail about [a person’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”131 And from the graveyard of unallocated disk space,
the government can even resurrect data that a user had intended to delete.132
Especially troubling is that data that may have been deleted precisely to pre-
vent its exposure to prying government eyes at a border checkpoint. Forensic
access to this deleted information comes dangerously close to giving gov-
ernment agents the power to copy a person’s innermost thoughts and retain
them indefinitely—an Orwellian panopticon if there ever were one.
Requiring probable cause and a warrant for a forensic search is also nec-
essary to prevent arbitrary, discriminatory, and harassing searches. Govern-
ment agents, even at their best, are human and make mistakes. At their
worst, they succumb to bias and prejudice, detaining and searching people
fitting a particular ethnic or religious profile. Border agents have detained
U.S. citizens merely for speaking a foreign language133 and have dispropor-
tionately strip-searched people based on race and gender.134 Allowing agents
unfettered discretion to decide which border travelers should have their de-
vices screened in a forensic search will lead to unjust profiling. Instead, re-
quiring affidavits for warrants based on probable cause will force border
agents to articulate their reasons for suspecting a person, and requiring a
129. Fontecchio, supra note 127, at 248–49.
130 . See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
540 (2005) (“To ensure the evidentiary integrity of the original evidence, the computer foren-
sics process always begins with the creation of a perfect ‘bitstream’ copy or ‘image’ of the origi-
nal storage device saved as a ‘read only’ file.”).
131. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
132 . Kerr, supra note 130, at 542–43.
133 . E .g ., Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443–46 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (U.S. citi-
zen of Egyptian origin detained after speaking Arabic with Egyptian friend on domestic flight);
Grace Panetta, The US Border Patrol Could Be Facing a Lawsuit After 2 US Citizens Say They
Were Detained for Speaking Spanish, BUS. INSIDER (May 24, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/border-patrol-racial-profiling-lawsuit-2018-5 [https://perma.cc
/R7FF-Q66W].
134 . E .g ., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-38, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE:
BETTER TARGETING OF AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUCE
BETTER RESULTS 12 & tbl.3 (2000) (showing that black women were more likely to be strip-
searched than other racial and gender groups).
528 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:507
magistrate’s approval will forestall invading someone’s privacy on the basis
of a single agent’s prejudice.135
A probable cause requirement would also mitigate the problem of data
retention. Currently, government agencies that collect such intimate data al-
so determine how long they can retain it. Although current CBP policy is to
destroy data obtained during a forensic search if no probable cause develops
from the search,136 there is only the agency’s word that it will do so. CBP
could change its policy in response to heightened security concerns. Or per-
haps the CBP guidelines will be—or already are—superseded by a secret ex-
ecutive order, purporting to rely on inherent Article II authority, to retain
any forensically obtained data indefinitely.137 Even if the data is kept ostensi-
bly for national security reasons, it remains ready to be used by a malevolent
government actor. Storing data is cheap,138 and presidents of all partisan
stripes have pushed the boundaries of constitutionality in the name of na-
tional security.139 The best way to prevent the government from preserving
innocent travelers’ private data is to prohibit gathering it at the outset with-
out probable cause and a warrant from a neutral magistrate.
Just as in Riley and Carpenter, a longstanding doctrine of the past gives
the government great discretion in deciding to conduct a search. But precise-
ly because it is longstanding, the border search doctrine is the product of a
time without the possibility of pervasive police surveillance. The Court has
held that historical practices cannot reasonably grant the government carte
blanche to copy and retain the immense amount of information stored in a
person’s digital devices. Far more so than GPS data and cell-site location in-
formation, a cell phone or laptop’s contents tell a “detailed chronicle” of
someone’s life over the span of months or years.140 The Executive, armed
with forensic software, “a tool so amenable to misuse,” requires “oversight
from a coordinate branch . . . to curb arbitrary exercises of police power.”141
And for the same reasons articulated in Riley, a warrant is necessary for the
135 . See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1609, 1614 (2012).
136. CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 100, at 7, 10.
137 . Cf . Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U .S ., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine
U .S . Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497
_story.html [https://perma.cc/KMM8-H5N2] (describing the PRISM program, revealed by the
Snowden leaks and which warrantlessly collected “the content of innocent Americans who
were swept up in a search for someone else”).
138. Google currently charges 2.6 cents per gigabyte of data per month for its cloud com-
puting storage. Cloud Storage Pricing, GOOGLE CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/storage
/pricing [https://perma.cc/ZT2L-VT79].
139 . See Paul Szoldra, This Is Everything Edward Snowden Revealed in One Year of Un-
precedented Top-Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leaks-timeline-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/DP9A-2X67].
140. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
141. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Executive to responsibly deploy such a tool: warrants are “an important
working part of our machinery of government,” needed to combat the ex-
cesses represented by the writs of assistance the Founders rebelled against.142
Thus, the “quantitative” and “qualitative” differences in the nature of elec-
tronic data143 defy the assumptions justifying the border search doctrine. Not
then, but now, the probable cause standard is needed to protect “the priva-
cies of life.”144 The rationale driving Jones, Riley, and Carpenter requires this
outcome.
D. Why Not Require Probable Cause for Other Intrusive Border Searches?
If probable cause is required for forensic border searches, though, why
not a higher standard for other border searches? Indeed, the logic of this Part
compels the conclusion that some other border searches must have higher
standards of suspicion than courts currently require. This last Section exam-
ines the implications of the Jones–Riley–Carpenter line on border searches of
property, intrusive searches of the person, and nonforensic searches of elec-
tronic devices.
For searches of tangible, nonelectronic property, this line of cases gives
little guidance. It is unlikely that a massive amount of intimate data like that
on an electronic device would ever pass through the border in physical doc-
uments.145 The privacy concerns implicated by forensic searches simply do
not apply to searches of luggage, of a vehicle, or even generally of one’s per-
son. As for particularly intrusive searches of the person, the reasonable sus-
picion standard may still provide a proper balance.146 If a person is reasona-
reasonably suspected of carrying drugs or explosives, there is greater urgency
for the government to search that person—both because of the tangible
harms the contraband can cause inside the country and because of its inabil-
ity to cross the border except at physical ports, unlike data.147
But for nonforensic searches, the balance of interests requires a change
to the status quo of suspicionless searches. Although Jones and Carpenter
primarily concern systemic, pervasive police surveillance that can piece to-
142. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–03 (2014) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
143 . Id . at 393.
144 . Id . at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
145. It seems improbable such a case would ever reach the courts, either. Even if a travel-
er brought into the country a literal warehouse’s worth of hard-copy documents and photo-
graphs, unless she were a high-profile international criminal, the government would hardly
want to expend the resources to copy each of those physical documents individually.
146. I hesitate here because of the real, lasting psychological harm a forced strip-search or
cavity search can cause. Perhaps a warrant based on probable cause would be better for those
searches; that question is beyond the scope of this Note. But reasonable suspicion does seem
like a fair standard for machine-based searches, like abdominal x-rays or microwave scans,
from which probable cause could develop.
147. Fontecchio, supra note 127, at 249–52.
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gether a person’s secrets, Riley still teaches that “unbridled discretion to
rummage at will among” even a few messages or pictures on a cell phone is
highly intrusive, especially if the searched data “date[s] back to the purchase
of the phone, or even earlier.”148 Indeed, the police searches in Riley had a
similar scope to a nonforensic border search, and the Court found the Riley
searches to require a warrant.149 Thus, in balancing the government and in-
dividual interests at issue in nonforensic searches, courts must consider the
deeply intrusive nature of even a cursory phone inspection.
The government interest at stake in a nonforensic search is primarily, as
with a forensic search, to exclude physical contraband from entry. But a
nonforensic search takes a fraction of the time to conduct, and a customs
agent could use the fruits of that search to immediately prevent contraband’s
entry. Accordingly, the government’s interest in performing nonforensic
searches is higher than for forensic searches. On the other side of the scale, as
the Court indicated in Riley, the privacy intrusion inherent in a nonforensic
search is serious—in the league of the general warrant.150 Even so, the intru-
sion is not nearly as severe as with a forensic search: files are manually in-
spected but not copied or retained. There is not the same danger of a
pervasive police surveillance.
Given the increased government burden from lost opportunities to con-
duct nonforensic border searches and the reduced intrusion on individual
privacy, probable cause is too high a standard. But to require no suspicion at
all would ignore Riley’s grave concerns with the government’s ability to
search a person’s electronic data at will. Therefore, the appropriate balance is
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person’s device will contain evidence
of contraband.151
CONCLUSION
The border search doctrine establishes a sovereign right to exclude un-
wanted persons and things, in effect making almost any search at the border
“reasonable.” But the doctrine creates a categorical rule unsuited for the
modern era. The Supreme Court has recognized in three recent cases that
government accumulation of large amounts of personal data, even through
otherwise lawful searches, strips individuals of their rightful privacy and
148 . Riley, 573 U.S. at 399, 394–99 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009)).
149 . Id . at 403.
150. See, for example, id . and Stanford v . Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965), each citing
a 1761 speech by James Otis that denounced the writs of assistance and quoting John Adams’s
response. Adams wrote that “[e]very man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as
I did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance” and that the speech was “the first scene of
the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child In-
dependence was born.” 10 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247–48 (C. Adams ed., 1856).
151 . See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
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gives the government a tool to facilitate further constitutional violations.
Applying this rationale to forensic searches at the border makes clear that,
just as other longstanding exceptions to the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements have yielded in the face of electronic data privacy, the border
search doctrine too must yield. Setting the proper balance of government
and individual interests in electronic data requires that the government de-
velop probable cause and seek a warrant for such an intrusive search into a
person’s data.
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